Clashes with machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, reminiscent of the civil war, played out for several hours along a former front line separating the Muslim and Christian sectors of the city. Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea denied his group was the aggressor, but said residents of Christian areas could not be blamed for defending themselves against armed Hezbollah militiamen marching through their neighborhoods. Hezbollah rarely comments on its military structure, weapons or number of fighters.
Most estimates for the number of fighters, however, range between 25, and 50,, including 10, elite troops known as the Radwan Force and a separate reserve force. Hezbollah is known to have stepped up recruitment in the years after the war with Israel.
Nasrallah said in his speech that those troops were armed and trained for warfare against Israel, not for an internal armed conflict. It was considered the first time Hezbollah used its weapons internally since the end of the civil war in No group claimed responsibility.
Hezbollah then fired tens of rockets near a military installation, prompting fears of an all-out war. Lebanon continues to reel from a devastating economic crisis since late , which the UN recently said has rendered 78 percent of the population into poverty.
Hezbollah with its greater influence and political representation has not been spared from criticism and contempt as part of a mosaic of ruling parties that plummeted the country. Nasrallah has opposed calls for the government to resign. By Kareem Chehayeb. Published On 15 Aug The pessimistic, optimistic and realistic scenarios for a divided nation. More from News. Olmert has said that rebuilding a north devastated by the war is his highest priority, but few would consider this goal to be a new platform for the party.
Amir Peretz is facing greater challenges from within Labor. Since the government was formed, a block of party dissidents who did not receive cabinet portfolios have taken every opportunity to criticize their party leader and his actions. They are led by former Ben Gurion University President Avishay Braverman and former head of Shin Bet Israeli counterintelligence and internal security service Ami Ayalon, two strong personalities, and their voices have grown louder since the war.
At the present time, the budget process is providing them with ammunition. Budget cuts to pay for the war are subordinating Labor's social and economic agenda; and the proposed budget contains more of the same.
Defense Minister Peretz is in the awkward position of having to support the military's demands, while conceding championship of social causes to his intra-party opposition.
As a former successful union leader who wrested control of Labor from an entrenched old guard, Peretz's abilities as an infighter should not be underestimated. Most Israeli governments last less than two years. The current government is not threatened by imminent demise, but many believe it will not survive two years.
While fighting has come to a halt, Iran and Hezbollah are vying with the United States and its international and Arab partners over which side can help rebuild southern Lebanon the fastest and win the "hearts and minds" of many distraught Lebanese civilians who have lost homes and businesses due to the war.
The money is meant to pay for rent and furniture while Hezbollah builds new homes for the displaced. Reportedly, the bulk of Hezbollah's largesse comes from Iran, which may have allocated hundreds of millions in aid to be channeled through Hezbollah to Lebanon. According to Time , Hezbollah has pledged to rebuild apartment buildings and entire villages within three years and has sent civil-affairs teams wearing hats that read Jihad For Reconstruction.
At this time, it is unclear whether the Lebanese government will be able to follow through on such a commitment. According to the U. According to Director of U. The international community also has recognized Lebanon's urgent need for reconstruction assistance, and on August 31, , donors convened in Stockholm, Sweden for a conference to raise reconstruction funds for Lebanon.
Some observers contend that countries opposed to Iranian influence in Lebanon have already fallen behind due to the slow pace of international financial and security commitments and the lack of adequate personnel on the ground to dispense aid. Sources: Estimates based on various media reports and U. State Department figures. For almost 30 years prior to , Lebanon's internal politics were dominated by Syria, which maintained a large military presence in Lebanon ostensibly as part of an Arab League peacekeeping force.
Though supported by some Lebanese, including much of the Shiite Muslim community, the Syrian presence was increasingly resented by other elements of the Lebanese population including Maronite Christians, Sunni Muslims, and Druze followers of a small sect derived from Islam. The assassination in February of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, widely blamed on Syrian agents because of Hariri's opposition to Syrian policies, led to a dramatic chain of events that profoundly altered the Lebanese political scene.
Under heavy domestic and international pressure, Syria withdrew its forces from Lebanon in April ; relatively free parliamentary elections were held in May and June without direct Syrian interference in the balloting process; a cabinet headed by a member of the anti-Syrian bloc was installed; and the U.
Security Council passed Resolution , which established an independent commission to investigate the circumstances of Hariri's murder. Initial reports of the commission seemed to implicate Syria or pro-Syrian Lebanese but findings remain inconclusive so far.
At the time, many observers interpreted Syria's unexpectedly rapid withdrawal and the subsequent election of an anti-Syrian majority in the Lebanese parliament as a major setback for Syria's ambitions in the region, and some even predicted that the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Asad had been seriously weakened. However, Syria maintained significant assets in Lebanon: a mixed government in Lebanon comprising both pro- and anti-Syrian elements see below ; a possible residual presence of Syrian intelligence assets in Lebanon; 28 and Hezbollah, which has refused so far to relinquish its arms and apparently continued to support Syria's agenda by periodically attacking Israeli military positions near the Israeli-Syrian border.
The Lebanese government itself is far from monolithic. On one hand, parliamentary elections gave a majority 72 out of seats to a large anti-Syrian bloc headed by the late Prime Minister's son; on the other hand, the Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah leads a seat minority bloc, and a third seat bloc headed by an independent former army officer is cooperating with the Hezbollah bloc on some issues.
President Emile Lahoud was elected with strong support from Syria and currently enjoys the support of Hezbollah as well; he refuses to retire before his term ends in Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, though a member of the anti-Syrian bloc, nonetheless heads a mixed cabinet which, for the first time in Lebanese history, contains two members of Hezbollah. Disputes over disarmament of Hezbollah, the status of President Lahoud, and relations with Syria have already created several cabinet crises and severely limited the ability of the government to deal with domestic and regional issues.
The day military confrontation between Hezbollah and the Israeli Defense Force in July and August greatly enhanced the prestige of Hezbollah at the expense of the Lebanese government. Hezbollah's leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah acquired a folk-hero status as his organization was widely hailed both for its military prowess in the conflict with Israel and for its perceived ability to initiate disaster relief projects far more quickly and efficiently than the regular governmental organizations.
Even those Lebanese who might be inclined to criticize Hezbollah for precipitating a crisis that devastated much of southern Lebanon have been muted, at least temporarily, by Nasrallah's soaring popularity and Hezbollah's success in delivering aid to large numbers of displaced persons and other homeless or destitute Lebanese.
Syria too, as a major sponsor of Hezbollah, finds that it has more maneuver room in dealing with Lebanese issues. Notably, the earlier enthusiasm among some Lebanese to pursue investigations designed to uncover a possible Syrian role in the Hariri assassination has dissipated, to a considerable extent.
The inevitable comparisons being drawn between Hezbollah effectiveness and Lebanese government ineptitude raise questions about the future of the Siniora government and its ability to withstand domestic criticism over its leadership during the current crisis.
To some extent, the answers to these questions depend on the interaction of Lebanon's diverse religious sectarian and political groups. Lebanon is the most religiously diverse country in the Middle East and its political system is based on a careful distribution of governmental posts by religious sect. Shiite Muslims constitute a plurality, though not a majority, of the population, and in recent years they have increased their influence in the Lebanese body politic as their numbers have continued to grow.
While not all Lebanese Shiites support Hezbollah, many observers believe Sheikh Nasrallah is likely to be heeded to a greater degree in the post conflict environment in Lebanon; he benefits from his ability to play multiple roles including military leader, reconstruction czar, and political participant.
Despite his currently favorable image, however, Nasrallah may prefer to enhance his role in the present government including participation by Hezbollah albeit at a junior level in the cabinet and leadership of a strong parliamentary bloc rather than to mount an uncertain challenge that could galvanize currently dormant opposition to the Shiite leadership in Lebanon. In the meantime, the interaction of government offices and agencies in Lebanon remains somewhat awkward, complicating the national decision-making process.
For example, Prime Minister Siniora, who maintains a dialogue with the United States and the international community, has not had direct dealings with Hezbollah, which the United States lists as a foreign terrorist organization, since the war began. Rather, Siniora and Nasrallah have communicated through the speaker of parliament, Nabih Berri, who is aligned with the Hezbollah-led bloc, but is a member of the more moderate Shiite faction known as Amal.
Realignments within the three somewhat amorphous blocs in parliament are also possible, if not likely, as the political situation continues to evolve in the aftermath of the July-August fighting. While some parts of Israel were also affected by the war, no additional assistance has been announced with the exception of an extension of existing loan guarantees.
Foreign assistance has been used to promote the peace process, spur economic development, and in the case of Israel, to strengthen its defense capabilities through military assistance.
Loan guarantees are a form of indirect U. Congress directs that appropriated or other funds be set aside in a U.
Treasury account for possible default. These funds, which are a percentage of the total loan based in part on the credit rating of the borrowing country , come from the U. Israel has never defaulted on a U.
The Bush Administration reportedly plans to submit a request to Congress to extend the authorization of Israel's loan guarantees through FY Reportedly, this aid would help modernize the Lebanese Armed forces LAF by providing funds for the procurement of spare parts to upgrade and repair the LAFs 5-ton military trucks, M armored personnel carriers, and UH-1H utility helicopters.
Of the total U. At this point, it is unclear how long the delivery of aid will be suspended. During the war, partisans on both sides of the conflict and some independent human rights activists alleged that the warring parties were targeting each other's civilian populations by employing inaccurate munitions that are designed to saturate wide areas with shrapnel or explosive sub-munitions.
Observers have condemned Hezbollah's indiscriminate firing of rockets into northern Israeli towns and cities in order to terrorize the population and cause extensive damage to infrastructure. According to the Jerusalem Post , many of the rockets fired contained anti-personnel munitions such as steel ball bearings. On September 14, , Amnesty International accused Hezbollah militants of war crimes and "serious violations of international humanitarian law" during the Lebanon war.
In a report that attempted to balance earlier accusations against Israel's bombing of civilian areas in Lebanon, Amnesty noted that Hezbollah's Katyusha rockets "cannot be aimed with accuracy, especially at long distances, and are therefore indiscriminate. Observers have decried Israel's use of cluster weapons to counter Hezbollah's rockets attacks. Since the United States is a major provider of military aid to Israel, the cluster weapons issue received media attention during and since the war and has reportedly become the subject of an Administration investigation.
Field and press reports suggest that large numbers of cluster weapon sub-munitions commonly referred to as "cluster bombs" remain scattered across areas of southern Lebanon in the aftermath of fighting between Hezbollah and the Israel Defense Forces IDF. The sub-munitions in southern Lebanon are the unexploded remnants of a range of Israeli ground- and air-launched cluster weapons, including bombs, artillery shells, and rockets.
The United States apparently supplied some of the cluster weapons that Israel used in the conflict. Israel reportedly fired many of the cluster weapons in question during the final days of the conflict.
Up to cluster weapon strike sites from the recent conflict have been identified, and U. Israeli officials maintain that the IDF carefully considered the potential for civilian casualties both during and following their military operations, and that IDF use of cluster weapons, as well as the IDF's broader methods during the southern Lebanon campaign, "are legal under international law and their use conforms with international standards.
IDF sources reported during the conflict that the predominant targets for their cluster weapons were Hezbollah-manned Katyusha rocket launch sites in open areas. Following the conclusion of the cease-fire agreement, the IDF transferred maps to UNIFIL forces showing likely locations for UXO and distributed warning notices to residents in conflict zones advising them to delay their return to their villages and homes until UXO had been cleared.
Department of State's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement has announced plans to expand an ongoing landmine and unexploded ordnance UXO humanitarian clearance program in Lebanon in the aftermath of the Israel-Hezbollah conflict.
According to press reports citing unnamed Administration officials, the Department of State has held up a shipment of M cluster munitions to Israel and initiated an investigation of the Israel Defense Force's use of cluster munitions during the recent fighting.
In early August, Israel reportedly requested that a pre-ordered shipment of U. Initial reports suggested the shipment was delayed out of concern over the weapons' potential use, and subsequent press reports suggest the shipment has been placed on hold.
President Bush repeatedly characterized Israel's military actions as "self-defense" during the conflict. Some opponents of the amendment argued that its language would unduly restrict the options available to U. Others called for hearings to further discuss the subject. In December , the U. Applicable criteria for adding Al-Manar to the TEL included inciting to commit a terrorist act and providing material support to further terrorist activity.
The effects of an entity being placed on the TEL could include the possible deportation and exclusion from the United States of individuals found belonging to or supporting the TEL designated organization. Though Al-Manar is banned from broadcasting its satellite signal into the United States, the station does upload its television programs and other like material on its website, which is accessible to any individual with an internet connection.
In making this designation, Stuart Levey, Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, stated, "Any entity maintained by a terrorist group—whether masquerading as a charity, a business, or a media outlet—is as culpable as the terrorist group itself. Future transactions between U. In December , Salim Boughader, an owner of a Lebanese restaurant in Mexico, was arrested by Mexican authorities on human-smuggling charges, as he is suspected of trafficking up to Lebanese nationals into the United States.
During post arrest questioning, Mr. Boughader reportedly admitted to knowingly providing assistance to an employee of Al-Manar in gaining unlawful entrance into the United States.
Boughader also stated that he assisted individuals with ties to Hezbollah, as he and other Lebanese people "did not see Hezbollah as terrorists.
On August 23, , Javed Iqbal was arrested on charges of offering live broadcasts of Al-Manar programming to potential customers in New York. Iqbal is suspected of offering customers access to the Al-Manar signal. It is reported that in the instances Mr. Iqbal installed the necessary equipment and attempted to retrieve the Al-Manar transmission, he ultimately was not successful in obtaining the desired signal. On August 29, , the U. The IRSO reportedly allowed its donors to specify whether or not they wished their funds to be used for military equipment or weapons purchases, in addition to a range of other services.
The action against IRSO has been followed by two actions against Lebanese and Iranian financial entities suspected of providing support to Hezbollah. On September 7, , Treasury's Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence TFI Stuart Levey announced the designation of Bayt al-Mal and the Yousser Company for Finance and Investment of Lebanon for serving "as Hezbollah's unofficial treasury, holding and investing its assets and serving as intermediaries between the terrorist group and mainstream banks.
Brigadier General Dani Arditi, advisor to the Israeli Prime Minister for Counterterrorism, confirmed that the strikes were meant to serve as a message "for all the Lebanese banks Assistance to Hezbollah is direct assistance to terrorist organizations.
Al-Manar, a satellite television station controlled by Hezbollah, broadcasts into most areas of the world. Al-Manar refers to itself as the "station of resistance" and has a stated mission of conducting "psychological warfare against the Zionist enemy. On two occasions during the recent conflict, Israel bombed the main Al-Manar facility located in southern Beirut. Though buildings on the complex caught fire, transmission satellite antennas were destroyed, and the station's signal went through brief periods of intermittent transmission, the network returned to broadcasting at full capacity shortly after these attacks.
The conflict in Lebanon challenged many Sunni Islamists, including jihadist Al Qaeda leaders such as Ayman Al Zawahiri, to reconcile their documented animosity toward Shiite Muslims with their desire to appear to be in solidarity with anti-Israeli and anti-American sentiment and activity that emerged around the Islamic world in response to the crisis. During the fighting, debate over the legitimacy of providing support for Hezbollah, a Shiite Lebanese militia, was particularly pointed on many extremist Internet fora and in a series of public statements issued by conservative Sunni Islamic leaders.
Some condemned Hezbollah's actions as part of a Shiite conspiracy to gain regional power or a leadership bid by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, while others argued that Sunni and Shiite Muslims should have united to confront Israel and its supporters.
The airing of diverse perspectives toward the crisis across the Arab and wider Islamic worlds brought the competing religious and political priorities of some important figures and groups into contrast and conflict. Conservative Sunni Islamic leaders, such as Qatar-based cleric and international Muslim Brotherhood figure Yusuf Al Qaradawi argued that Muslims should support the activities of Hezbollah and Hamas as legitimate "resistance" activities, based on Quranic injunctions to defend Muslim territory invaded by outsiders.
Moreover, groups or individuals may utilize religious figures' judgments and statements to justify future attacks on the interests or personnel of Israel, the United States, or their own governments should the crisis flare up again. Disagreements also emerged among violent Sunni Islamist extremists, including Al Qaeda and its affiliates. In a July 31 Internet posting, an Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula representative seemingly rejected any unitarian sentiment between violent Sunni groups and Hezbollah by characterizing Hezbollah as "the head of the Iranian spear in the Arab region," and arguing that "any support to Hezbollah in Lebanon is indirect support for the Iranian objectives.
On July 27, Al Zawahiri stated that "our nation will get together to fight [Israel and its allies]," but he refrained from directly urging Sunni-Shiite unity or advocating direct Sunni support for Hezbollah. He specifically called on "the Muslim nation" to aid "its Muslim brothers in Lebanon and Gaza," and urged Lebanese Muslims "to reject international resolutions, particularly the recent Security Council Resolution There are many divergent interpretations of the July-August war in Lebanon and its implications for U.
On the one hand, some consider this conflict to be just the latest battle in a global war on terror pitting the democracies of the West and Israel against terrorist organizations backed by radical regimes.
Others view the war less in terms of an overall effort against Islamic extremism and more of a battle between powerful nation-states, seeing Lebanon as the battleground in an "opening round" of an Iranian-Israeli struggle for regional preeminence.
Still, some observers assert that the war is simply another chapter in a long history of localized Arab-Israeli violence spurred by the lack of any discernable progress in a peace process. In reality, there may be elements of truth within all of these perspectives.
The conflict has posed its own set of challenges for U. In a broader sense, the war has jeopardized not only the long-term stability of Lebanon but has presented the Bush Administration with a basic dilemma.
On one hand, the Administration is sympathetic to Israeli military action against a terrorist organization; President Bush has spoken in favor of Israel's right of self-defense. On the other hand, the fighting dealt a setback to Administration efforts to support the rebuilding of democratic institutions in Lebanon.
One commentator suggested "the two major agendas of his [Bush's] presidency—anti-terrorism and the promotion of democracy—are in danger of colliding with each other in Lebanon. If Lebanon disintegrates through a return to communal civil strife or becomes closely aligned with Syria or Iran, U. The United States would lose a promising example of a modernizing pluralist state moving toward a resumption of democratic life and economic reform and quite possibly face a return to the chaos that prevailed in Lebanon during the year civil war.
Such conditions would be likely to foster terrorism, unrest on Israel's border, and other forms of regional instability. Moreover, the growth of Syrian or Iranian influence or some combination of the two could strengthen regional voices supporting extremist and likely anti-Western views associated with clerical regimes Iran , totalitarian models Syria , or a militant stance toward Israel. A viable cease-fire, on the other hand, could be an initial step toward further progress in the long quest for regional peace.
With Hezbollah deeply ingrained in Lebanese Shiite society, the movement has become a fixture in the political system, though whether or not its militia and terrorist wings can be disarmed remains to be seen. Many Israelis remain deeply skeptical over international efforts to disarm Hezbollah, as the real work of preventing re-armament over land, sea, and air will take place behind the scenes in the months ahead.
Israeli sources are already reporting the renewal of Syrian and Iranian shipments to Hezbollah though such reports are difficult to confirm. A key aspect of Hezbollah's possible re-armament is the role of Syria.
Many questions remain concerning Syria: the willingness of the United States and Israel to bring Syria into the diplomatic mix, Syria's influence over Hezbollah in a Lebanon free of Syria's military occupation, and what demands Syria may make in exchange for its possible cooperation.
Some observers suggest a variety of theoretical incentives that the West could provide Syria, including the end of its isolation by the United States and the removal of Syria from the State Department's terrorism list and the relaxation of economic sanctions; the tacit recognition of its influence in Lebanese politics; the ratification of the EU Association Agreement with Syria that provides it with certain trade benefits; diminished international pressure regarding the U.
Others believe that U. After the recent attack on the U. Finally, speculation over the winners and losers of the war will most likely be debated for some time. Israeli officials believe that their overwhelming response to Hezbollah's provocation caught it and Iran off-guard and that Israel's subsequent operations have eroded its opponents' deterrent capabilities along the Israeli-Lebanese borders.
Nevertheless, there are many Israelis both in and out of the government who believe that the war was poorly managed, did not achieve its goals, or was simply ill-conceived. Hezbollah claimed that by merely surviving, it gained a symbolic victory over the more powerful Israeli army and that it continued to threaten Israel with rocket attacks after weeks of Israeli attempts to destroy its arsenal. Iran may believe that it achieved an ideological victory against Israel, seeing the conflict as producing increased Arab and Muslim support for Lebanese Shiites and for overall Iranian opposition to Israel.
Analysts caution that increased Arab and Muslim support for Hezbollah may simply be a temporary phenomenon in response to solidarity with the Lebanese people and sympathy for Lebanese civilian casualties. Others see increasing domestic political pressure in moderate Arab states and elsewhere, such as Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and even Turkey to condemn Israel and hold the United States partially responsible for civilian casualties in Lebanon as a way to deal with popular anger and their own Islamists.
The following was originally the opening section of this report and has been included in the Appendix for use a resource on background to the July-August war. It will not be updated. Although Hezbollah's July 12, , kidnaping of two Israeli soldiers initiated the conflict in southern Lebanon, tensions in the region had grown since the Hamas electoral victory in Palestinian legislative elections in January Over the course of the next six months, Israeli-Palestinian relations deteriorated rapidly, culminating in renewed fighting in the Gaza Strip, only months after Israel withdrew entirely from the territory and evacuated its settlements.
Most observers assert that Hezbollah used the clashes between Hamas and Israel as a pretext and justification for its July 12 attack. The following sections provide background on how the region was transformed over six months from one of relative calm to full-scale war. In response, the Quartet i. The electoral victory of Hamas surprised many outside observers and created a series of policy challenges for the Bush Administration, which had supported the election process as part of its efforts to reform the Palestinian Authority and its broader Middle East democracy promotion agenda.
Israel and members of the Quartet took steps to limit the provision of non-humanitarian aid and financial resources to the Hamas-controlled Palestinian Authority based on Hamas leaders' refusal to accept the Quartet principles. The loss of customs revenue and direct foreign aid created crippling budgetary shortfalls for the PA and significant derivative economic hardship for many Palestinian citizens.
President Abbas referred to the steps as a "siege," and throughout April, May, and June , tensions over unpaid salaries and disagreements over command responsibilities flared between the Hamas-led government and armed security force personnel loyal to Fatah. Palestinian leaders, including President Abbas, engaged in several efforts to end the intra-Palestinian violence and bring closure to open questions of official Palestinian support for the Quartet principles see discussion of the National Accord Document below.
However, before these efforts could bear fruit, fresh violence between Israel and Hamas erupted in the Gaza Strip and has escalated. In March , Hamas and 12 other Palestinian groups agreed to extend an informal truce or "calm" referred to in Arabic as a hudna with Israel for one year.
Some call the agreement a cease-fire even though it was a unilateral Palestinian declaration to which Israel was not a party. Palestine Islamic Jihad PIJ did not agree to the calm and was responsible for several suicide bombings within Israel in the period that followed.
Hamas, which had been responsible for many suicide bombings during the second intifadah Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation that had begun in September , refrained from such attacks after declaring the hudna. It did, however, continue to fire mortars and rockets against Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip before Israel's summer withdrawal from the region and into southern Israel after Israel's withdrawal.
Israel usually responded with air and artillery strikes, but it also carried out what it terms targeted killings of terrorists. On June 9, , a Palestinian family was killed on a Gaza beach. The Palestinians claimed that the victims had been struck by Israeli artillery fire, but Israel denied responsibility for the deaths. Nonetheless, the incident provoked Hamas to call off its truce and intensify rocket fire into southern Israel.
Also in June, Palestinian factions held an intense national dialogue in the West Bank and Gaza in which they ultimately agreed on a National Accord Document also known as the Prisoners' Document because Hamas and Fatah leaders imprisoned by Israel had collaborated on the first draft to reconcile their positions and goals.
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